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Firms’ Moral Hazard in Sickness Absences
* 
 
Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from 
the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their 
workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for 
firms, leading to the inefficient monitoring of absences or to an underinvestment in their 
prevention. In the present paper, we investigate firms’ moral hazard problems in sickness 
absences by analyzing a legislative change that took place in Austria in 2000. In September 
2000, an insurance fund that refunded firms for the costs of their blue-collar workers’ 
sickness absences was abolished (firms did not receive a similar refund for their white-collar 
workers’ sickness absences). Before that time, small firms were fully refunded for the wage 
costs of blue-collar workers’ sickness absences. Large firms, by contrast, were refunded only 
70% of the wages paid to sick blue-collar workers. Using a difference-in-differences-in-
differences approach, we estimate the causal impact of refunding firms for their workers’ 
sickness absences. Our results indicate that the incidences of blue-collar workers’ 
sicknesses dropped by approximately 8% and sickness absences were almost 11% shorter 
following the removal of the refund. Several robustness checks confirm these results.   
 
 
JEL Classification:  J22, I38 
  





René Böheim  
Department of Economics 




E-mail: Rene.Boeheim@jku.at   
 
                                                 
* Support from the Austrian National Research Network “Labor Economics and the Welfare State” is 
gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to Natalia Danzer, Marco Ercolani, Martin Halla, Helmut 
Rainer, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Martina Zweimüller, Mike Brewer, Stuart Adam and seminar participants 
in Engelberg, Essen, Linz, Munich, Colchester and London for their valuable comments. Björn Fanta 
and Clemens Kozmich provided excellent research assistance. Böheim gratefully acknowledges 
CESifo Munich’s hospitality. 1 Introduction
Sickness absences lead to signicant losses in productivity for rms and,
consequently, to lower incomes and prots (Barham and Begum, 2005; Brown
and Sessions, 1996). Labor laws typically grant workers continued pay if
they are unable to work because they are ill. However, guaranteed sick pay
may induce workers to \adapt their work-absence behavior" (Johansson and
Palme, 2005, p. 1880). In other words, workers may be absent from work
without actually being sick. Johansson and Palme (2005) nd such a moral
hazard problem for Swedish workers. Similarly, Ziebarth (2009) estimate that
a reduction in the replacement rate for sick workers in Germany from 100%
to 80% led to some 12 fewer days of sick leave.
Countries dier with respect to how they share the costs of sickness absence
between workers, rms, and the social security system. Firms in most OECD
countries face direct and indirect costs because of absences, but they are,
to some extent, insured against their workers' sicknesses. Insurance arises
because either the amount or the period of sick pay is limited, or rms are
refunded for their costs. For example, Norwegian rms need to pay the
rst 16 days of a worker's sickness absence at a replacement rate of 100%;
however, the worker's wages are paid by social security thereafter (Markussen,
Mykletun and Roed, 2010). In Germany, rms that have fewer than 30
employees receive 80% of their costs refunded by an insurance fund (Ziebarth,
2009). Depending on how the insurance system is organized, rms may
pass their costs onto the public, for example by exerting too little eort in
monitoring or preventing absences.
1We use an exogenous change in the way Austrian rms are compensated for
their workers' sickness absences in order to shed light on these rms' moral
hazard problems. The Austrian social insurance system provides an excel-
lent setting for the analysis of moral hazard and sickness absences because
Austrian legislation guarantees each regular employee continued wage pay-
ments for at least six weeks, to be paid by the employer. Barmby, Ercolani
and Treble (2002) argue that to understand fully the impact of regulations
on absence rates, it is necessary to gather data that enable the analysis of a
regime shift within a single jurisdiction.
Until September 2000, small rms received a full refund for the direct costs
(gross wages and employers' social security contributions) of blue-collar work-
ers' sickness absences. Indirect costs, such as replacements, restructuring, or
down-time, were not refunded. Large rms, by contrast, received only 70% of
paid wages. The denition of a small rm was based on the rm's wage bill (of
month t 2), and refunds were paid automatically within three months. Be-
tween September 2000 and January 2001, only sickness absences that started
before September were refunded, and no refunds were made after January
2001.1 We use the end of the refund period in 2000 to investigate whether or
not workers' absences were aected by dierent policy regimes. The 2001 re-
form abolished the reimbursement for blue-collar workers' absences, thereby
increasing costs for rms.
The data used in the present study are from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD). The ASSD is the administrative database for the calcu-
1A partial refund was reintroduced for small rms in September 2002; however, there
is no dierential treatment for blue- and white-collar workers under this regime.
2lation of pension benets for private sector employees in Austria. We then
linked these data to the administrative database of public health insurance,
which covers all employees, in order to obtain information on workers' sick-
ness absences.
Changes in the incidences or durations of sickness episodes may indicate
that rms as well as workers react to the incentives built into the system.
The literature on sickness absences, recently summarized in Ziebarth (2009),
focuses almost entirely on workers' behavior. An exception is the recent con-
tribution by Fevang, Markussen and Red (2011), who analyze reform in the
Norwegian sick leave insurance scheme, where employers are exempt from re-
funding sick pay for pregnancy-related absences. They show that this exemp-
tion from refunding sick pay led to approximately 5% more sickness absences.
The present study estimates that the removal of the refund resulted in ap-
proximately 8% fewer blue-collar workers' sicknesses and shortened sickness
absences by approximately 11%. We provide a series of robustness checks,
which conrm the reliability of our results.
Our ndings are important for the design of sickness insurance systems in
many countries. According to Scheil-Adlung and Sandner (2010), as many as
145 countries within and outside the OECD provide paid sick leave. Sick pay
regulation is a central component of modern welfare states, and provisions
aimed at insuring workers against the loss of income because of illness date
back to the very origins of the welfare state.
32 Institutional settings
Workers in Austria continue to receive their wages from their employers if
they are unable to attend work because of sickness for a period of up to 12
weeks, depending on length of tenure. Private sector workers in Austria are
employed either as blue-collar or as white-collar workers depending on the
types of tasks that they carry out. Although this distinction has lost most
of its original relevance through recent legal reform, labor law provisions
generally remain more favorable to white-collar workers than they are to blue-
collar workers. In particular, for blue-collar workers the maximal duration
of continued wage payments in the case of sickness is xed within a calendar
year, regardless of how many times a worker falls ill, whereas white-collar
workers may claim longer periods of wage payments within a calendar year
if they fall ill repeatedly. (Blue-collar and white-collar workers also dier
with respect to their periods of notice and their treatments in the case of
dismissal.)
Both blue-collar and white-collar employees are entitled to at least six
weeks of continued wage payments in the case of sickness or accident. Ac-
cording to Austrian employment protection legislation, being on sick leave
does not provide any form of protection from dismissal. An employee who
is dismissed while on sick leave does, however, retain the right to continued
wage payments for the full period prescribed by law. A worker that has a
tenure of ve years has an entitlement of up to eight weeks, a worker that has
a tenure of 15 years has an entitlement of up to 10 weeks, and a worker that
has a tenure of 25 years or more is entitled to up to 12 weeks of continued
4wage payments.2 After this period, workers continue to receive their wages
for another four weeks; however, during these four weeks, the wage is split
equally between the rm and the social security. After these four weeks, the
worker receives sick pay from the social security for up to one year, which is
50% of the wage until the 42nd day of sickness and 60% thereafter.
Until September 2000, rms received a refund for the wages they had paid
to sick blue-collar workers. The amount of the refund depended on a rm's
total wage bill. If a rm's total monthly wages exceeded a threshold, namely
180 times the maximum daily social security contribution, it was considered
a large rm. This classication was based on the wage bill in month t for
sicknesses in month t+2. The threshold for this denition was e18,836.82 in
2000, which corresponded to approximately 10 full-time blue-collar workers
if they were paid the monthly median wage (e1,822). Although the refund
compensated rms only for blue-collar workers' absences, the denition of
a small rm was based on the wages of both blue-collar and white-collar
workers. The compensation was paid automatically within three months by
the social security administration.
Small rms received 100% and large rms received 70% of the wages of
sick blue-collar workers. The regulation intentionally favored smaller rms
because they were assumed to have more problems covering sickness absences
compared with larger rms. In particular, small rms may need to hire
replacement workers if any of their permanent employees are sick. Large
rms, by contrast, can often cover for sick workers by reallocating tasks
2Before 2001, the maximum durations for blue-collar workers were two weeks shorter
than they were for white-collar workers.
5within the rm.3 There was no refund for the wages a rm had to pay
white-collar workers when they were sick.
The compensation fund (Entgeltfortzahlungsfond) was nanced by employ-
ers' contributions of 2.1% of their blue-collar workers' wages. This fund was
managed by the Austrian social security administration. Upon its abolish-
ment on September 30, 2000, only sickness episodes that started before this
date were eligible for a refund and no refunds have been provided since Jan-
uary 2001.4 A sick worker needs to see a medical doctor who certies the
sickness and informs the social security administration. The worker is re-
quired to inform his or her employer about the expected period of sickness
leave. A moral hazard problem arises not only because workers have an in-
centive to remain absent more often and longer than is necessary, but also
because rms are insured against their blue-collar workers' sickness absences.
The availability of this refund may cause rms to monitor their absent work-
ers less, which will result in higher absence rates.5
Large rms, because they receive only partial compensation for their blue-
collar workers' sicknesses, have a relatively stronger incentive to monitor
their workers' absences and to encourage earlier returns to work. As stated,
3This assumption is supported by the economic literature on absenteeism. For instance,
Barmby and Stephan (2000) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that
show how rm size is inversely related to the costs result-ing from absences.
4From October 2000 until September 2002, rms received no compensation for their sick
workers' wages. Since September 2002, small rms have been receiving a compensation of
50% of the paid-out wages towards their sick workers' wages, if the sickness absences lasted
longer than 10 days. Small rms are now dened as rms where the average employment
is less than 51 employees per year. A rm is also considered to be small if the average
number of employees is 53 or fewer because of the employment of apprentices or disabled
workers. Because of the dierent denitions of rm size, we do not analyze rms' behavior
in the later regime.
5Firms might even encourage prolonged absences, for example if demand is low.
6the inecient monitoring of workers will lead to more frequent and longer
sickness absences. Thus, the abolition of the refund and the change in sickness
behavior around this date will provide evidence of the extent of rms' moral
hazard problems. Because the reform removed the dierential treatment of
small and large rms, we would not expect employers to take any specic
course of action with respect to rm size or wage bill when learning about
the pending reform.6
3 Theoretical motivation and empirical re-
search design
We sketch the key features of the institutional setting with a simple con-
ceptual model, based on Barmby, Sessions and Treble's (1994) model. Each
rm i is assumed to maximizes its prots, , subject to wage costs. (The
workforce is normalized to one.) Workers receive sick pay s, 0 < s  w, if
they are unt for work. Because utility increases in income and leisure, a
worker has an incentive to remain absent from work, namely pretending to
be sick (\shirking"). This incentive depends on the probability of detection,
the consequences of being found out, and the utility from leisure. A worker's
utility from leisure also depends on health, where sickness increases the value
of leisure.
Assume that the rm observes in each period a fraction  of its workers
6An analysis of the Austrian media shows that there was hardly any public discussion
on the proposed law before April 2000. After April 2000, the Austrian media started to
report on the proposed changes and, especially before the start of the new rules, reported
on the abolishment of the refund.
7on sick leave, 0    1. A fraction  of the workers that are on sick leave
is genuinely unt for work, 0    1, whereas 1    are shirking. The
rm may spend some xed costs per worker, , on a monitoring technique
that detects shirking with probability , 0    1. If someone is detected
shirking, the worker is red and the rm no longer pays sick pay. A rm will
monitor its absent workers if the cost of monitoring, , is less than are the
gains from detecting shirking workers, (1   )s. Note that a high level of
s will increase the likelihood of monitoring.
Wage costs are given by:
wage bill = (1   )w + s + (1   )(1   )s + ; (1)
where (1   )w are the wages paid to workers who appear for work, s is
the sick pay for genuinely sick workers, (1   )(1   )s is the sick pay for
shirking workers that are not detected, and  is the expenditure spent on
monitoring absent workers.
Now consider the eects of refunds, r, with r  s, for rms' monitoring. A
rm will not monitor its workers if the expected gains from monitoring are
less than are the costs:
(1   )(s   r) < 




which implies that a suciently high refund will cause the rm to stop moni-
toring its absent workers for shirking. (If r = s, equation (2) is trivially true.)
8Depending on the costs of monitoring, even refund rates of less than 100%
will result in inecient levels of monitoring. The non-monitoring rm's wage
bill is then given by the wages paid to non-absent workers, (1 )w, plus the
dierence between sick pay paid to sick workers and the refund, (s   r).7
We analyze how rms respond to the end of the compensation for sickness
absences by exploiting the dierential impacts of the reform across dierent
sized rms and workers that have dierent qualications. Our estimation is
a dierence-in-dierences-in-dierences (DDD) specication that enables us
to exploit the double variation in treatment across rms and worker groups.
This empirical strategy gives us a precise causal estimate of the degree of
moral hazard inherent in the full refund policy that existed prior to the
reform for small rms in comparison with the partial refund for large rms.
The DDD model is also adequate to quantify the total impact of the reform
on sickness absence in Austria.
Our unit of observation is the rm, and we analyze the average number of
sickness leaves per worker in the rm (the extensive margin) and the average
duration of sickness leave per worker (the intensive margin). For each rm i
in month t, we take the sum of sickness spells recorded for blue-collar workers
and divide it by the number of blue-collar workers. Similarly, we sum the
sickness spells recorded by white-collar workers and divide it by the number
of white-collar workers.
7This simple model does not consider indirect costs, such as the disruption of an as-
sembly line, that arise from worker absences. Theoretically, if these costs are substantial,
they will provide a rationale for monitoring absences even in the presence of a large refund
of direct costs. In most cases, however, it is unlikely that these indirect costs exceed a
fraction of the direct costs represented by continued wage payments.
9We distinguish between sicknesses in small and large rms and before and
after the reform. An indicator, blue-collar, is set to unity if the sickness
absence was recorded by a blue-collar worker and to zero if it was recorded
by a white-collar worker. We regress the sickness indicator, yitc, of worker
type c in rm i in month t on a set of explanatory variables:
yitc = 0 + (blue-collar  period  small)itc
+1blue-collaritc + 2perioditc + 3smallitc
+4(blue-collar  period)itc + 5(blue-collaritc  small) (3)
+6(period  small)itc + X
0
it + "itc;
where  are parameters to be estimated and , the coecient on the triple
interaction term, is the parameter of interest. (For the ease of the interpre-
tation of the estimated coecients as elasticities, we scale yitc by the average
for each group,  yc.) The parameter  gives the causal change in sicknesses for
blue-collar workers in small rms because of the end of the refund of sickness
costs. The vector X contains rm characteristics, for example the fraction of
women in the rm, and a linear trend. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
We assess the overall impact of the reform by summing the eects for blue-
collar workers in small and in large rms. All coecients that are necessary
to quantify these eects can be recovered from the DDD model.8
8For small rms, the impact of the reform is given by  +4 and the change in sickness
absence in large rms corresponds to 4.
104 Data
We use register data from the ASSD.9 These data provide information on all
employees in dependent employment but do not include the self-employed or
civil servants. Because each worker can be linked to a particular employer
via a unique rm identier, we can construct rm-level information, such as
rm size and the number of sickness absences or their average durations, in a
particular rm. We augment these data with information on statutory health
insurance. The data from the health insurance are from a single Austrian
state, "Upper Austria," and provide information on sicknesses, in particular
on days of paid sick leave.10
Our sample consists of all rms with at least one employee in 2000 and
2001. We compare rms' sickness indicators for the period January-August
2000 with those of January-August 2001. We selected these two periods to
minimize variation in sicknesses owing to the seasonality of sicknesses. We
provide estimates from dierent periods in our robustness checks in section 6.
Labor legislation mandates that workers must provide a medical certicate for
all absences of more than three days. Employers are also allowed to ask their
employees to provide a certicate for sick leaves of shorter durations. Because
not all rms request a medical certicate from the rst day of absence, short
absences are not fully covered by the administrative data and we restrict
9Zweim uller, Winter-Ebmer, Lalive, Kuhn, Wuellrich, Ruf and B uchi (2009) provide a
detailed description of these data. The ASSD provides matched employer-employee data
detailing the labor market history of almost 11 million individuals from January 1972 to
April 2007 in more than 2.2 million rms.
10In 2000, this state accounted for approximately 17.5% of workers and 18% of rms
(NACE C-E) in Austria (Austria, 2009).
11the data to spells of durations that are longer than three days. We also
restrict the sample to those spells that last up to 42 days because this is the
minimum duration rms have to pay sick pay. The nal sample consists of
256,337 rm-months observations.11
Table 1 shows the mean number of sickness episodes and their durations in
small and large rms by blue-collar and white-collar workers and by period.
Because it may be easier to extend a period of sick leave compared with
obtaining sick leave when not actually sick, we expect a stronger reaction
of the sickness durations than of the incidences. Before the reform, both
incidences and durations of sickness were signicantly larger in small than
they were in large rms. If the refund provided an incentive for rms to
monitor their sick workers less, we expect to see that the average sickness
incidences and durations of blue-collar workers decreased both in small and
in large rms. Because the refund was larger for small rms, we expect the
reaction in small rms to be greater than it was in large rms. The values
for white-collar workers should have remained unchanged because rms did
not receive a refund for their sickness absences.
These expectations are supported by the mean values in Table 1. We see
that the average durations for blue-collar workers decreased more in small
rms than they did in large rms. Blue-collar workers in small rms were sick
less often after the reform than they were before, and there was a very small
11In terms of individual workers, 4.1% (3.8%) were blue-collar workers in small rms,
2.8% (2.7%) were white-collar workers in small rms, 45.9% (45.7%) were blue-collar
workers in large rms and 47.1% (47.7%) were white-collar workers in large rms between
January and August 2000 (2001). These four groups accounted for 7.6% (7.7%) , 4.4%
(4.8%) , 55.8% (57.0%) and 32.2% (31.9%) of paid sick days in 2000 (2001).
12drop in the sickness incidences in large rms. The sicknesses of white-collar
workers hardly changed, however.
Figure 1 shows that blue-collar workers in small and large rms had similar
sickness patterns before the reform, in particular an increase in sickness ab-
sences during winter months. After the reform, sickness incidences declined
in small rms and the typical spike in sicknesses during winter months was
not as pronounced in small rms as it was in large rms. The dierence
between small and large rms is more evident when we turn to sickness du-
rations in Figure 2. Especially after the reform in September 2000, we see
that durations, contrary to long-term seasonal patterns, were shorter. By
contrast, the plots for white-collar workers in Figures 3 and 4 suggest that
neither the incidences nor the durations of sickness absences changed.
The reform could have induced rms to substitute away from blue-collar
workers as their relative price increased (slightly) relative to white-collar
workers.12 Figure 5 plots the average monthly proportion of blue-collar work-
ers in small and large rms over time. This plot suggests that there was no
visible pattern of substitution after the reform.
Tables 2 presents the summary statistics of our sample by rm size and
period. The average values for the incidences and durations of sicknesses
mirror the results in Table 1. We see that there were fewer and shorter
sicknesses after the reform and that this change was more pronounced in small
than it was in large rms. The summary statistics for the other characteristics
12However, this is unlikely in the short-term because workers are classied as blue-collar
or white-collar workers depending on the tasks they perform. Such a substitution would
require, for example, restructuring the production process.
13indicate that the rms changed only slightly in the two periods, and we do
not see dierent changes for small and for large rms.
5 Results
Table 3 shows the DDD estimates of average sickness durations. The spec-
ications dier in the included covariates in that the rst specication has
no covariates other than the indicator variables. A set of rm character-
istics is included in specication 2. Specication 3 additionally includes a
linear trend, and specication 4, our preferred specication, also includes
a group-specic linear trend for small rms. The causal eect is given by
the estimated coecient on the triple interaction term described above. (All
listed coecients can be interpreted as elasticities.)
In each of these specications, the estimated causal eect is statistically sig-
nicant at conventional error levels. This suggests that durations decreased
on average by approximately 7% more in small rms than they did in large
rms following the removal of the refund. Note that the estimates are almost
identical across specications. Table 4 presents the results for the incidences
of sickness. We nd that the sickness incidences of blue-collar workers in
small rms were signicantly lower after the end of the refund period than
they were in large rms. The eect is also similar in magnitude to the eect
found for sickness durations, the reduction was approximately 6.3%. These
are large eects, and they imply that rms' moral hazard problems because
of the refund were substantial and led to inated sickness absences.
14The overall eect of the reform is the total change in blue-collar workers'
sickness absences caused by the abolition of the refund policy. For small
rms, this eect is given by  +4 and corresponds to a reduction by 8.3% in
incidences and by 10.8% in durations. The change in large rms (expressed
by the coecient 4) corresponds to a decrease by 2.0% in incidences and by
3.7% in durations. Together these reductions account for 1.7% of all absences
and 2.9% of all absence days recorded by private sector employees (with the
restriction that we take into account only absences between 4 and 42 days of
duration).
5.1 Robustness
Our estimates indicate that the abolishment of the refund resulted in approx-
imately 6% fewer blue-collar workers' sicknesses and shortened these periods
of absence by approximately 7%. We provide a series of robustness checks to
gauge the reliability of these results.
Because medical sickness certication is mandatory only after the third
day of illness, the coverage of short absences depends on whether rms make
use of their right to request a certication for absences of less than four days.
The abolition of the refund in 2000 may have inuenced the way in which
rms handle these short absences. Because rms receive no refunds after the
reform, they have a lower incentive to require workers to supply a doctor's
note for short sicknesses. By contrast, an increase in monitoring eort fol-
lowing the end of refunds might work exactly in the opposite direction and
compensate for the disincentive to request a medical certicate. In our rst
15robustness check, we thus include all absences between one and three days.
The results in Table 5, column 1, show that the estimated treatment eect
diers only marginally.
As previously stated, we restricted the main sample to absences of up to
42 days because this is the maximum duration a rm has to pay wages for
sick workers that have tenures of up to ve years. Arguably, workers who
are absent longer are sick more severely. If we assume that severe sicknesses
are more dicult to manipulate compared with shorter sicknesses, then we
expect to nd a lesser treatment eect if long sickness durations are included
in the estimation. The estimation results for the sample with no restriction
on the upper bound of sickness duration are presented in column 2 of Table 5.
These estimates show indeed that including long spells leads to statistically
insignicant estimates of the treatment eect.
We also rene the sample to remove potentially problematic observations.
First, we restrict the sample to rms that do not change their size category,
namely those rms that are always small or always large. This removes
27,275 observations from our overall sample of 256,337 observations. Again,
we essentially obtain the same results (column 3).
We also restrict the sample to non-seasonal sectors because rms in these
sectors may dier in their degrees of monitoring compared with seasonal
rms. This reduces the number of observations to 164,744. In this sub-
sample, the reform led to a reduction in incidences similar to that observed
in the full sample. The reduction in durations was less pronounced (4.3%),
however, and it was not statistically dierent from zero. This suggests that
16prior to the reform the moral hazard problem was particularly accentuated
in the seasonal sectors of the economy, where rms face large variations in
capacity utilization|and arguably in incentives for worker monitoring|in
the course of the year. (See Del Bono and Weber (2008) for a description of
the seasonal sector in Austria).
In the next step, we vary the observational window and compare the rst
three months of 2000 with the rst three months of 2001, which provides
us with a sample of 107,868 observations. Limiting the observational period
to the rst three months of 2000 aims at avoiding the announcement eects
from the media coverage that started in April 2000. Announcement eects
could lead rms to implement monitoring procedures or to re sick workers
prior to the reform, which would lower the treatment eect.
Although these are short periods, the maximum period after the reform
that we are able to investigate is the 20 months until September 2002, be-
cause the refund was reinstated at that time. If we select the same number
of months before September 2000, we can compare the period of January
1999 to September 2000 with the period of January 2001 to September 2002
(N=646,613). Alternatively, in order to avoid possible biases by announce-
ment eects, we can compare sicknesses in 1999 with sicknesses of 2001
(N=391,831). The estimated treatment eects vary little across the various
sample renements and conrm the robustness of our results (Table 6).
175.2 Dierence-in-dierences
If white-collar workers are not an appropriate control group for blue-collar
workers, because the reform changed the monitoring levels of all types of
workers, then our DDD estimates are biased. Note that if the reform led rms
to more strictly monitor both their blue-collar and their white-collar workers,
the DDD model underestimates the true reduction in sicknesses caused by the
reform. (The underestimated treatment eect is, however, an upper bound
of the true treatment eect.) A dierence-in-dierences comparison of blue-
collar workers' absences in small and large rms, before and after the reform,
will estimate the extent of the change in sickness behavior for blue-collar
workers because of the end of the refund period.
We estimate the following specication, where yit is either the incidence or
the duration of blue-collar workers' sicknesses in a rm i at time t, divided
by the mean value,  y:
yit = 0 + (small  period)it +
+1smallit + 2periodit + X
0
it + it; (4)
where the treatment eect, , and  are the parameters to be estimated; the
indicators and the explanatory variables are dened as above.
The estimates presented in Table 7 indicate that blue-collar workers in
small rms had fewer and shorter sickness spells after the reform in compar-
ison with blue-collar workers in large rms. Although the estimated coe-
cients are marginally larger (in absolute value) than are the eects we obtain
18from the DDD estimates, the results provide corroborating evidence of rms'
moral hazard problems.
Because the refund was only available for the sicknesses of blue-collar work-
ers, the end of the refund period should have had no eect on how rms
treated white-collar workers; therefore, we should not be able to estimate
statistically signicant eects for the sicknesses of white-collar workers. Our
estimates show that this expectation is only partially fullled. The estimated
treatment eect for sickness incidences is not statistically dierent from zero.
The estimated eect for sickness durations is, however, statistically dier-
ent from zero, and this indicates that white-collar workers' sickness absences
were shortened by approximately 4.4% following the end of the refund period.
This indicates that the end of the refund period did change the sicknesses of
white-collar workers slightly and our estimates from the DDD model repre-
sent a conservative lower bound for the actual response to the reform.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed sickness absences in small and large rms that had received
dierent compensations for the wages they paid to their sick workers. Small
rms received more compensation than did large rms because of their pre-
sumed diculties in covering the tasks usually carried out by sick workers.
Using administrative data, we found robust evidence for rms' moral hazard
problems using the dierential treatments of small and large rms and of
blue-collar and white-collar workers as sources of variation. We identied a
19causal eect by comparing sickness behavior in two dierent policy regimes,
namely one with and one without compensation. We estimated that the
incidences of blue-collar workers' sicknesses in small rms dropped by ap-
proximately 8% and that sickness durations were almost 11% shorter after
the reform. As expected, the eect of the reform on large rms was less
pronounced. Overall, the reform reduced the durations of sickness absences
in the private sector by almost 3%.
Our ndings are of interest for the design of social insurance policies and
sick pay systems. Sick pay regulation is a central component of modern
welfare states and, according to Scheil-Adlung and Sandner (2010), as many
as 145 countries provide paid sick leave.13 Similar settings to the one analyzed
here exist, for example, in Germany, Denmark, and the UK. In Germany,
rms that have fewer than 30 employees are eligible for a refund of 80%
of the wages paid to sick workers. These examples could be expanded to
all instances where the sick pay system fails to provide adequate incentives
for rms to monitor their employees' absences. Clearly, the moral hazard
problem is exacerbated in institutional settings|such as the Austrian case
until 2000|where (some) rms have little incentive to monitor absenteeism,
while at the same time workers benet from high replacement rates during
sickness.
In 2000, the Austrian social security administration counted 39.2 million
absence days for private sector employees. Approximately 25 million days
13In 1883, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initiated sickness insurance leg-
islation that included paid sick leave for workers in the case of illness for a period of 13
weeks.
20were caused by absences of between 4 and 42 days. If we assume that the
distribution of workers and rms in our sample is representative of other
Austrian provinces, we could attribute 1.9 million absence days to blue-collar
workers in small rms, namely 7.6% of all absence days. Our estimated re-
duction of 10.8% would correspond to approximately 205,000 fewer sickness
days for this group alone. The reduction in sickness absences in large rms
adds another 515,000 sickness days to this estimate. If we approximate the
economic costs of an absence day using the median daily gross wage of e60.4
in 2000, the estimated savings to the sick pay system would be approximately
e43.5 million (corresponding to approximately 2.8% of the total costs of con-
tinued wage payments for all absences (regardless of duration) in that year).14
These gures represent reference points for situations that are comparable
to the case investigated here. They strengthen the argument for legislation
that calls on rms to carry a proportion of the costs of sick pay, especially
with respect to short and medium absence periods.
It would, however, be wrong to conclude that shifting the burden to rms,
especially if this shift were substantial, would necessarily increase overall
welfare in an economy. A shift of sick pay costs|be it through the abolition
of refunds or the extension of the employer's liability period|could result
in a worker's health status playing an increased role in rms' hiring (and
ring) decisions, which may lead to unintended eects on the employment of
workers suering from poor health.
Recent results by Fevang et al. (2011) conrm the expectation that rms
14The Austrian Ministry for Social Aairs estimated the costs sustained by private
companies to be e1.58 billion in 2000 (Ministry for Social Aairs, 2011).
21respond to an increase in liability by employing fewer workers with a (pre-
sumed) propensity for absences, such as older workers or pregnant women.
Fevang et al. (2011) corroborate the view that rms inuence the absence
behavior of their workers and that they react quickly to incentives. Recent
discussions on sickness absence regulations have stressed the demand-side
and supply-side aspects of absence behavior (Bonato and Lusinyan, 2007;
Rae, 2005). The optimal design of sickness insurance legislation thus has to
consider adequate risk coverage, while containing the moral hazard problems
that aect workers and rms.
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small large
Blue−collar sickness spells, by firmsize.
Note: The graph plots the monthly averages of blue-collar workers' sickness spells in a
rm, divided by the number of blue-collar workers, counted in the month of the start of
the spell. Only spells with durations of 3 to 42 days. Small (large) rms are rms where
the monthly wage bill was below (above) a threshold, imposed by the social security. See
text for details.
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small large
Blue−collar sickness duration, by firmsize.
Note: The graph plots the monthly averages of blue-collar workers' days on sick leave in
a rm, divided by the number of blue-collar workers, counted in the month of the start of
the spell. Only spells with durations of 3 to 42 days. Small (large) rms are rms where
the monthly wage bill was below (above) a threshold, imposed by the social security. See
text for details.
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small large
White−collar sickness spells, by firmsize.
Note: The graph plots the monthly averages of white-collar workers' sickness spells in a
rm, divided by the number of white-collar workers, counted in the month of the start of
the spell. Only spells with durations of 3 to 42 days. Small (large) rms are rms where
the monthly wage bill was below (above) a threshold, imposed by the social security. See
text for details.
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small large
Average sickness duration, by firmsize.
Note: The graph plots the monthly averages of white-collar workers' days on sick leave in
a rm, divided by the number of white-collar workers, counted in the month of the start of
the spell. Only spells with durations of 3 to 42 days. Small (large) rms are rms where
the monthly wage bill was below (above) a threshold, imposed by the social security. See
text for details.
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small large
Fraction of blue−collar workers, by firmsize.
Note: The graph plots the monthly averages of the fraction of blue-collar workers in rms'
total number of workers. Small (large) rms are rms where the monthly wage bill was
below (above) a threshold, imposed by the social security. See text for details.
28Table 1: Sickness absences in small and large rms.
Firmsize Blue-collar workers White-collar workers
Before After Di. Before After Di.
Small
Incidence 0.293 0.272 -0.021 0.227 0.223 -0.004
Duration 2.730 2.444 -0.286 2.019 1.922 -0.097
N 33,947 32,194 32,537 32,067
Large
Incidence 0.127 0.122 -0.005 0.071 0.070 -0.001
Duration 1.201 1.113 -0.088 0.599 0.574 -0.025
N 29,616 30,042 32,580 33,354
Note: Before: January{August 2000. After: January{August 2001. Incidence: All sick-
ness episodes in a month that lasted between 3 and 42 days, divided by the number of
blue-collar (white-collar) workers, counted in the month of their start. Duration: All
days on sick leave for spells that lasted between 3 and 42 days, divided by the number of


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 3: Estimated impaction on sickness durations, spells between
3 and 42 days length.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.080 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Small 0.896 -0.269 -0.270 -0.742
(0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.094)
After -0.016 -0.001* 0.717 0.826
(0.006) (0.007) (0.059) (0.057)
Blue 0.379 0.416 0.416 0.416
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Small*after -0.045 -0.041 -0.040 -0.241
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.044)
Blue*after -0.039 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Small*blue 0.069 0.117 0.117 0.116





N 256,337 256,337 256,337 256,337
adjusted R2 0.052 0.152 0.152 0.152
Note: The table summarizes the estimation results of the eect the abolishment of the
refund had on the incidence of sickness absences. Method of estimation is OLS. Listed
coecients multiplied by 100 give the percent change in the sickness incidence due to
the abolishment of the refund. Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of
unknown form) are in parentheses. 256,337 rm-month observations. Other covariates
in specications (2){(4) are ln(average wage), ln(rm size), fraction of women, fraction
of blue-collar workers, fraction of workers aged 55+, average age, indicators for industry
and for quarter. All estimates are statistically signicant at 10%, or less, except where
indicated by .
31Table 4: Estimated impact on the incidence of sickness absences,
spells between 3 and 42 days length.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.070 -0.062 -0.063 -0.063
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Small 0.883 -0.268 -0.269 -0.606
(0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.078)
After -0.009 -0.001* 0.732* 0.810
(0.005) (0.006) (0.048) (0.047)
Blue 0.318 0.361 0.361 0.361
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Small*after -0.016* -0.012* -0.011* -0.155
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036)
Blue*after -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Small*blue 0.052 0.119 0.119 0.118





adjusted R2 0.068 0.182 0.182 0.182
Note: The table summarizes the estimation results of the eect the abolishment of the
refund had on the incidence of sickness absences. Method of estimation is OLS. Listed
coecients multiplied by 100 give the percent change in the sickness incidence due to
the abolishment of the refund. Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of
unknown form) are in parentheses. 256,337 rm-month observations. Other covariates
in specications (2){(4) are ln(average wage), ln(rm size), fraction of women, fraction
of blue-collar workers, fraction of workers aged 55+, average age, indicators for industry
and for quarter. All estimates are statistically signicant at 10%, or less, except where
indicated by .
32Table 5: Robustness: Sample restrictions.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Incidence
Treatment -0.065 -0.056 -0.073 -0.061
(0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.035)
N 256,337 256,337 229,062 164,744
adjusted R2 0.228 0.195 0.188 0.174
Duration
Treatment -0.068 -0.041 -0.074 -0.043
(0.030) (0.041) (0.034) (0.041)
N 256,337 256,337 229,062 164,744
adjusted R2 0.162 0.108 0.166 0.143
Note: All specications as in Tables 1 and 2, column 4. (1) Durations between 1 and
42 days. (2) Durations longer than three days (no upper limit). (3) No change in size
category, durations 3{42 days. (4) Removing seasonal sectors, durations 3{42 days.
Table 6: Robustness: Comparison of dierent periods.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Incidence
Treatment -0.065 -0.068 -0.078
(0.039) (0.023) (0.019)
N 107,868 391,831 646,613
adjusted R2 0.175 0.180 0.179
Duration
Treatment -0.069 -0.085 -0.085
(0.046) (0.027) (0.022)
N 107,868 391,831 646,613
adjusted R2 0.147 0.149 0.149
Note: All specications as in Tables 1 and 2, column 4. All spells with durations 3{42
days. (1) Pre-period: January{March 2000; post-period: January{March 2001. (2) Pre-
period: 1999; post-period: 2001. (3) Pre-period: January 1999{August 2000; post-period:
January 2001{August 2002.











adjusted R2 0.151 0.156
Note: The table summarizes the estimation results of the eect the abolishment of the
refund had on the incidence of sickness absences as in equation 4. Method of estimation is
OLS. Listed coecients multiplied by 100 give the percent change in the sickness incidence
due to the abolishment of the refund. Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedas-
ticity of unknown form) are in parentheses. Other covariates are ln(average wage), ln(rm
size), fraction of women, fraction of blue-collar workers, fraction of workers aged 55+,
average age, indicators for industry and for quarters. Spells with durations between 3 and
42 days. a p-value of 0.041.
34